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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE FIFTY YEARS AFTER SAX
AND SOME THOUGHTS ON ITS FUTURE
Michael C. Blumm* & Zachary A. Schwartz**
The public trust doctrine was resurrected by Professor Joe Sax in
a now famous article a half-century ago. Sax explored the doctrine’s
history and maintained that it had contemporary significance at the dawn
of the modern environmental movement in 1970. Sax thought that the
historic use of the doctrine to prevent monopoly use of important
waterways could be expanded to meet the necessities of the times by
protecting important natural resources from unwise or unsustainable
depletion for public use, including use by future generations. His vision
ignited a substantial expansion in the scope and purposes of the doctrine
over the past 50 years. Some of the most surprising developments have
occurred internationally, which Sax’s article did not expressly anticipate.
This analysis, written on the 50th anniversary of Sax’s article,
examines the public trust doctrine both before and after the article,
revealing the considerable effect it has had on courts and legislatures. In
addition to suggesting the great debt public trust scholars and the public
at large owe to Sax’s prescience, this article hazards some predictions
about the likely evolution of the doctrine in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine (PTD) was practically reinvented a halfcentury ago by Professor Joseph Sax in his famous article.1 Although the
doctrine has been implicit in sovereignty at least since the Roman Empire,2
Sax resurrected the public rights it recognized at the dawn of the modern
environmental law era.3 He also presciently observed that trust resources,
traditionally interpreted to center on navigable waters to promote public
water-borne commerce and fishing, need not be confined to those
waterbodies, but could be invoked to apply to wetlands, upland resources,
*
Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark
Law School. We are grateful for the editorial review by Michael Benjamin Smith, 3L,
Lewis and Clark Law School.
**
3L Lewis and Clark Law School, B.A. Dartmouth College.
1.
Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Sax’s article has been
cited by 47 cases and over 1,100 articles, according to a search on HeinOnline, last
accessed March 31, 2020.
2.
See infra notes 27–39 and accompanying text (discussing the Roman
and English origins of the PTD).
3.
See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29–42 (2004) (explaining the emergence of federal
environmental law in the 1970s).
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and even the atmosphere.4 Sax unearthed the Supreme Court’s 1892
decision in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois as the lodestar case
recognizing the PTD’s potency as a restraint against government perfidy.5
But Sax’s treatment of the PTD largely overlooked the great
expansion of the doctrine’s scope that took place during the late 19th
century, as the Supreme Court approved lower courts’ expanded definition
of “navigable waters” that included inland waterways that were in fact
navigable, not just tidal waters as had been the case in England.6 This 19th
century expansion is an important part of the PTD’s history in an era in
which some commentators aimed to confine the scope of the doctrine to
what they perceived to be its inherent limits.7 Sax’s article also did not call
attention to the beginning of the PTD’s evolution beyond navigable waters
entirely to include non-navigable waters whose bedlands were privately
owned. This evolution also began in the 19th century and became quite
pronounced in the 20th century.8
Although Sax overlooked some of the great expansion of the PTD
that occurred in the 19th and early 20th centuries, in the half-century that
followed his article, the PTD fulfilled many of his predictions and more.
Beginning shortly after 1970, the doctrine gave the public the right to
protect the ecological and recreational value of tidelands in California;9
recognized public rights to recreate on ocean beaches in New Jersey;10
required evaluation of ecological considerations in the administration of
4.
Sax, supra note 1, at 556–57 (“Thus, . . . protections which the courts
have applied in conventional public trust cases would be equally applicable and
equally appropriate in controversies involving air pollution, the dissemination of
pesticides, the locations of rights of way for utilities, and strip mining or wetland
filling on private lands in a state where governmental permits are required.”).
5.
Sax, supra note 1, at 489–91.
6.
See infra notes 44–53 and accompanying text (discussing the
expansion of the American PTD in the 19th century).
7.
See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust
Doctrine is Bad for the Public, 45 ENVTL. L. 337, 340 (2015) (“Sax’s invitation to
liberate the public trust doctrine from its historical shackles—so enthusiastically
embraced by many in the academy—has been largely rejected by the courts.”).
8.
See infra notes 75–87 and accompanying text (discussing the
expansion of the PTD beyond title navigability); see also 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, § 32.03(a)(1) (Amy K. Kelly ed. 3rd ed. 2018) (discussing the so-called
“pleasure boat” test for navigability).
9.
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971); see infra note 21.
10.
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112
(N.J. 2005) (applying the PTD to ensure public use of a private beach, applying the
factors established by Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J.
1984); see infra notes 156–72 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey’s
application of the PTD to beaches).
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water rights in California;11 gave trust protection to groundwater in
Hawaii;12 was construed to be implicit in the federal due process clause in
an atmospheric trust case;13 and gave implementation force to an
international treaty on climate.14 Several of these developments were
beyond the Saxion vision a half-century ago.15
At the time of Sax’s article—coinciding with the beginning of the
modern environmental law16—courts had recognized public rights to
access and protect navigable waters, but had yet to devote attention to the
Illinois Central Court’s recognition that the doctrine’s application could
extend to all natural resources “in which the whole people are interested”
or which are the “subject of public concern to the whole people of the
state.”17 Sax made that oversight apparent,18 and the scope of resources
subject to the PTD has expanded ever since.19
Courts’ recognition of the purposes served by the PTD were also
in transition when Sax wrote. In a case ongoing at the time of his article,20
the California Supreme Court eventually ruled that the PTD included

11.
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983) (“Mono Lake”); see infra notes 173–86 and accompanying text (discussing the
Mono Lake decision).
12.
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000)
(“Waiahole Ditch”); see infra notes 188–209 and accompanying text (discussing the
Waiahole Ditch decision).
13.
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016),
overruled on standing grounds by Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.
2020); see infra notes 218–31 (discussing American atmospheric trust litigation).
14.
The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, Supreme Court
of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:102 (2019) (“Supreme Court Decision”),
aff’g State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, Hague Court of Appeals,
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (2018) (“Court of Appeals Decision”); see supra notes
262–68 and accompanying text.
15.
See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the
Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to
Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 750–56 (2012).
16.
But certainly not the origin of environmental law, which arguably
existed as early as the 1880s. See KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945–70 (2009), reviewed in Michael
C. Blumm, Debunking the “Divine Conception” Myth: Environmental Law Before
NEPA, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269 (2010).
17.
Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455–56 (1892).
18.
Sax, supra note 1, at 556–57.
19.
See infra notes 156–281 and accompanying text.
20.
Sax, supra note 1, at 530–31 (mentioning lower court’s decision in
Marks).
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protection of recreational and ecological resources.21 Soon other courts
would see that the PTD was more than a public access right to trust
resources but also a vehicle to protect those resources for future
generations.22 The libertarian-minded scholars condemned this judicial
evolution as unwarranted judicial activism.23
In the last several years, the PTD’s reach has extended
internationally, with groundbreaking decisions in India, the Philippines,
Pakistan, Colombia, and the Netherlands, among other countries.24 A
number of decisions, both domestic and international, have located the
public trust in constitutions,25 giving it a firm legal foothold. Perhaps the
most arresting PTD decisions are those concerning its implications for
governmental failures to combat climate change.26
This article surveys the PTD both before and since Professor Sax’s
article a half-century ago. Section I provides a brief overview of the origins
of the doctrine, on which there has been some important new scholarship
concerning its Roman roots. Section II explains the growth of public rights
in navigable waters in 19th and early 20th century America, to which the
Sax article gave only passing attention. Section II also examines the
Supreme Court’s Illinois Central decision, considered by Sax to be the
doctrine’s “lodestar,” but also discusses the public trust in wildlife and the
extension of the PTD to non-navigable waters, both well underway by
1970. Section III turns to Sax’s article, which gave the doctrine its name
and made several other notable contributions. Section IV explores the
growth of the PTD during the last half-century, focusing especially on the
entrenching of the doctrine in domestic and international constitutions.
The article concludes with some predictions about the PTD’s evolution
during the next half-century.

21.
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“There is a
growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the
tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the preservation of those
lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific
study.”).
22.
See infra notes 222–42 and accompanying text.
23.
See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A
History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3 (2007);
Huffman, supra note 7, at 339.
24.
See infra notes 244–91 and accompanying text.
25.
See infra notes 156–295 and accompanying text.
26.
See infra notes 222–43 and accompanying text.
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II. ROMAN AND ENGLISH ORIGINS
PTD critics have questioned the Saxion claim of the Roman
origins of the doctrine, apparently in the belief that if its Roman roots were
not genuine, the PTD could be exposed as an illegitimate threat to private
property rights.27 The arguments of these critics have been undermined by
two analyses of Roman law published in the last year, which suggest that
the language of the Institutes of Justinian (promulgated in A.D. 533) that
Sax referenced,28 was merely a codification of earlier Roman law, deriving
from earlier treatises by Roman jurists Gaius (circa A.D. 160), Ulpian
(circa A.D. 170–223), and Marcian (circa A.D. 220–230).29
Hundreds of years before Justinian, Roman law recognized
shorelands as public property, although the law tolerated private villas,
which did not have the right to exclude fishers from accessing the sea.30
Ulpian, in particular, recognized that the sea and the shore “are the
common property of everyone, like the air; . . . [and] no one can be
prohibiting from fishing.”31 Thus, the recognition of res communes central
to the Justinian legacy turns out to be firmly established hundreds of years
earlier. Although it is not clear whether the Romans divided ownership
between trustees and beneficiaries, Roman law did recognize the state’s
reversionary interest in the private villas on the shore.32

27.
See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 23, at 12–19 (2007) (relying mainly
on two articles to discount the Roman origins of the PTD: Glenn J. McGrady, The
Navigability Concept in Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current
Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511
(1975); Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical
Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976)).
28.
The passage from the Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1 (Thomas Cooper
trans & ed. 1841), known as the res communes omnium (“things common to all”),
reads: “these things are by natural law common to all: air, flowing water, the sea, and
consequently the shores of the sea.” Sax referenced the passage in his article. Sax,
supra note 1, at 474 n.15.
29.
Bruce W. Frier, The Roman Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine, 32
J. ROMAN ARCHAEOLOGY 641, 642–43, 646 (2019); J.B. Ruhl & Thomas A.J.
McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine: What Was It, and Does It Support an
Atmospheric Trust?, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 117 (2020). After providing some context for
the Justinian passage, supra note 28, Ruhl and McGinn observe that although the
Institutes were “firmly within the core body of Roman law,” they were hardly an effort
to create new law, instead being a synthesis of Roman law going back centuries in an
effort to remove inconsistencies and obsolete principles. Id. at 130.
30.
Frier, supra note 29, at 645–46.
31.
Id. at 646.
32.
Id. at 647.
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Later, in the 14th and 15th centuries, Venetian legal scholars
erected a claim of prescription unrecognized in Roman law as a defense to
the city’s claim of ownership of lagoons in the Adriatic Sea on which the
city was built.33 But the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, in his 1609 treatise
Mare Liberum, invoked Justinian’s res communes to refute Portuguese and
Spanish claims of ownership of the sea and to justify freedom of the seas.34
Meanwhile, in England, the Magna Charta had recognized public
rights in what came to be called “navigable waters” in 1215, and a few
years later an amendment known as the Forest Charter recognized public
rights in royal forests.35 However, the predecessor most responsible for
transporting the PTD across the Atlantic was Lord Mathew Hale, a
distinguished jurist and Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, who wrote De
Jure Maris, which was not published until 1787, over a century after Hale
authored it.36 Like the Roman concept of res communes, Hale interpreted
the Magna Charta to recognize public rights to fish in waterways that were
“common highways.”37 Private shoreland owners had no right to exclude
the public from such waterways; instead, the King had jurisdiction, to be
exercised “not primarily for his profit, but for protection of the people and
promotion of the general welfare.”38 Hale thus introduced the role of the
sovereign as trustee over waterways that were common resources.39
33.
See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 29, at 147.
34.
See id. at 149 (“Grotius deploys the evidence of Latin literature,
especially the work of Cicero and Seneca, to argue that the sea, or at least large stretches
of it, cannot be owned, but must remain accessible to use by all as provided by nature.”).
The article proceeds to analyze at some length scholarship on the res communes concept,
focusing on late 19th and early 20th century interpretations of the writings of Marcian
and Ulpian and concluding that the inclusion of air in res communes was likely a
reflection of the economic importance of bird-catching. Id. at 149–158.
35.
See Michael C. Blumm & Courtney Engel, Proprietary and
Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinian and Hale to Lamprey and
Oswego Lake, 43 VT. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2018) (pointing out that these fishing and
navigation rights benefited commoners, unlike most of the other provisions of Magna
Charta, which largely benefited the nobility). On the Forest Charter, see Daniel
Magraw & Natalie Thomure, Carta de Foresta: The Charter of the Forest Turns 800,
47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,934 (2017).
36.
See Blumm & Engle, supra note 35, at 8 n.40.
37.
LORD CHIEF-JUSTICE MATHEW HALE, A TREATISE IN THREE PARTS,
IN A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATED TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 9, 21–22 (Francis
Hargrave ed., T. Wright 1787). These waterways came to be known as navigable
waters in the wake of The River Banne decision, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1611),
although there is some dispute over whether U.S. courts correctly interpreted the
decision. See Blumm & Engle, supra note 35, at 7 n.34, 9 n.41.
38.
Id. at 6.
39 . Id. Allowing the waterbody to be the subject of private claims of
ownership could allow monopolization of the resource on which “the whole people”
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III. THE PTD BEFORE SAX
American courts recognized the American PTD before Sax wrote,
beginning early in the 19th century, if not before. The foundation cases
involved disputes over oyster harvests on the Raritan River (named after a
local Algonquian tribe), which flows in central New Jersey east into
Raritan Bay, near Staten Island. A half-century later, the Supreme Court
recognized the inalienability of public trust resources in a case that Sax
made the centerpiece of his analysis.40 Ensuing Supreme Court opinions
quickly distinguished the jus publicum from the jus privatum at the core
of the PTD41 and applied the sovereign ownership doctrine to wildlife.42
Simultaneously, state courts began to recognize public rights in trust
resources and for trust purposes far beyond the public rights recognized in
the federal title cases.43 This section discusses these developments.
A. The Dawn of the American PTD
Hale proved quite influential in American courts. For example, in
an 1805 case substantially reinterpreting the meaning of riparian water
rights, Chief Justice James Kent cited Hale’s treatise in concluding that
both freshwater and tidal waters were under “the servitude of the public
interest, and may be of common or public use . . . as common highways
by water.”44 Several decades later, the Supreme Court referenced Hale in
a landmark case upholding state regulation of rates charged by grain

depended for transport, fishing, and commerce. See supra text accompanying note 17
(discussion of Illinois Central). Antimonopoly was and is a prime goal of the PTD.
See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an
Antimonopoly Doctrine, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 1 (2017).
40.
Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892); see infra
notes 54–65 and accompanying text.
41.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894) (“this title, jus privatum,
whether in the king or in a subject, is held subject to the public right, jus publicum, of
navigation and fishing”); see infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
42.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896); see infra notes 70–
74 and accompanying text (discussing Geer).
43 . See, e.g., Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893)
(expanding the scope of the PTD to recreational uses); see infra notes 75–85 and
accompanying text (discussing Lamprey).
44.
Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
(reinterpreting riparian rights to permit reasonable uses, discounting interferences with
“natural flow”); see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780–1860, at 37–38 (1977) (discussing the significance of Palmer v. Mulligan in
transforming water law).
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elevators operating as adjuncts to railroads because they were “affected
with a public interest.”45
Hale’s influence was most apparent in the foundation PTD case of
Arnold v. Mundy. In Arnold, Justice Andrew Kirkpatrick of the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled that Benajah Mundy and other oyster harvesters
could exercise public rights to harvest in the tidal Raritan River despite
adjacent landowner Robert Arnold’s claimed right to exclude them
because ownership of adjacent lands did not include the bed of the river.46
Kirkpatrick quoted Hale to the effect that “the common people of England
have regularly a liberty of fishing . . . as a public common piscary,” which
could not be denied by monopolistic landowners.47
Kirkpatrick’s decision in Arnold was collaterally attacked in a
case that reached the U.S. Supreme Court involving another oyster
harvesting conflict on the very same Raritan River. The landowner
succeeded in the lower federal court, but the Supreme Court reversed in
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee.48 Chief Justice Taney not only endorsed
Kirkpatrick’s reasoning in Arnold as “unquestionably entitled to great
weight,” he relied on Hale for the proposition that “the common people”
45.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). The grain elevators
functioned as common carriers, obliged to take all grain tendered to them by the
railroads, and offering their services to the public at a fixed price. See Edmund W.
Kitch & Clara Ann Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 313
(1978). The phrase “affected with a public interest” is one which the Illinois Central
Court would echo, see infra notes 54–65 and accompanying text.
46.
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 42 (1821). J.B. Ruhl and Thomas
McGinn unearthed an earlier PTD decision, Harrison v. Starrett, 4 H. & McH. 540,
545, 548 (1774), concerning Sterrett’s large fill in Maryland’s Patapsco River, which
interfered with the vessel traffic of his neighbor. After proclaiming the superiority of
public rivers in the river and citing Justinian, the provincial court denied Harrison
relief due to a failure to show “special injury” necessary to pursue a public nuisance
case. See Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 29, at 134–35. An early PTD case that did award
injunctive relief was Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 478 (Pa. 1810), concerning
Pennsylvania’s Susquehanna River, in which the state supreme court announced that
a shoreland landowner had “no exclusive right to fish in the river immediately in front
of his lands [because] the right to fisheries [in tidal rivers] is vested in the state, and
open to all.” But it was Arnold v. Mundy, which the U.S. Supreme Court later
endorsed. See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
47.
Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 74. Kirkpatrick supplied some updating to Hale’s
Old English language. See Blumm & Engle, supra note 35, at 10 n.49. Laying the
foundation for the modern PTD, Hale interpreted the Magna Charta to ensure
landowners had no “privilege or prerogative” over a river on which the whole people
depended; moreover, the king’s jurisdiction over a waterway was “not primarily for
his profit, but for the protection of the people and the promotion of the general
welfare.” Hale, supra note 37, at 6.
48.
41 U.S. 367 (1842).
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have “a liberty of fishing in the sea, creeks, or arms thereof, as a public
common of piscary.”49 Taney announced that the Raritan River was “held
as a public trust for the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used
by all for navigation and fishery.”50 Professor Sax may have invented the
term “public trust doctrine,” but the Supreme Court recognized the
doctrine over a century before his article.
B. Expanding the Geographic Scope of the PTD in the 19th Century
The PTD the Supreme Court ratified in Martin v. Waddell might
have been interpreted to be confined only to original states like New Jersey
with royal grants, but within three years the Supreme Court expanded the
scope of public rights in navigable waters to all states under the so-called
“equal footing doctrine.”51 Consequently, by the mid-19th century the
Court had significantly expanded the scope of public rights in navigable
waters and their submerged lands.
Before long, the Court expanded the definition of navigable
waters beyond tidal waters to include inland waterways that were
navigable-in-fact, first in federal admiralty jurisdiction,52 and then to state
proprietary ownership.53 By 1876, the expanded definition of navigable

49.
Id. at 412–13, 417–18, citing Hale, supra note 37, at 11.
50.
Id. at 413 (emphasis added). State ownership of navigable waters did
not prevent riparian landowners from “wharfing out,” so long that the wharf did not
obstruct navigation, although wharfing out did not imply any private property rights
in the submerged land, since “any encroachment upon the shore, or other part of the
public domain, may at all times be restricted and controlled by legislation.” Gough v.
Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 469 (1850).
51.
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228–29 (1845) (applying the state
ownership doctrine of navigable waters recognized in Martin v. Waddell to the new
states of the West under equal footing, reasoning that they should have the same
ownership rights and public obligations as the original states). Even though the
original states did not benefit from the equal footing conveyance of submerged lands
and had developed their own state laws of navigability for land title purposes, the
Fourth Circuit ruled that equal footing and associated federal land title rules applied
to those in North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 853 F.3d 140, 149 (4th
Cir. 2017) (en banc).
52.
The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457 (1851);
see Blumm & Engle, supra note 35, at 12 nn.60–61 (discussing Genesee Chief, which
overruled The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (1825), which had limited federal
admiralty jurisdiction to tidal waters).
53 . Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876) (applying navigability
under admiralty to proprietary ownership); see Blumm & Engle, supra note 34, at 12
n.62 (discussing Barney). Over a century later, the Court clarified that the expansion
of navigable waters to include those that are navigable-in-fact did not mean that tidal
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waters, coupled with the federal equal footing doctrine, led both to
expanded federal regulatory jurisdiction and to increased state proprietary
ownership. Public usufructuary rights increased correspondingly.
C. The Lodestar Case: Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois
According to Professor Sax, a long-running dispute over the
ownership of most of the inner harbor of Chicago was “[t]he most
celebrated public trust case in American law.”54 The dispute concerned the
Illinois state legislature’s 1869 grant of the bed of Lake Michigan to a
railroad company, which would in all probability use its ownership to
control shipping on the lake both to and from its shoreside tracks.55 An
ensuing legislature thought better of the grant four years later and revoked
it.56 Although it took some two decades for the case to reach the Supreme
Court,57 the Court upheld the legislature’s right to revoke the grant without
compensation in 1892.58 The Court, per Justice Stephen J. Field, explained
that the state’s ownership of the lakebed was “in trust for the people . . .
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have a liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.”59 Submerged lands had “different in
character” than public lands available for sale, since they were trust lands,
requiring “management and control” by the state.60
Consequently, according to Justice Field, the state could “no more
abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested,
like navigable waters and the soils underneath them . . . than it can abdicate
its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation
of the peace.”61 Thus, the Court held that the lakebed was largely
inalienable, because privatization would “place every harbor in the
country at the mercy of a majority of the legislature of the state in which
waters were not always categorically included within the term. Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1988).
54.
Sax, supra note 1, at 489.
55.
For a detailed analysis of the case, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas
W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004).
56.
The 1869 grant was likely influenced by corruption, see id. at 887–
95, 927–30.
57.
See id. at 913–19, explaining why the case took so long to reach the
Court.
58.
Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 187 (1892).
59.
Id. at 452.
60.
Id. at 452–53.
61.
Id. at 453.
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the harbor is situated.”62 The result of such privatization of public
resources “would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a
free people.”63 Although the Court was careful to announce two exceptions
to its non-alienation rule,64 Illinois Central established that resources of
great public concern were held by the sovereign in trust for the people,
largely inalienable, seemingly universal, and protected by searching
judicial review.65
D. Recognizing the Jus Publicum
Just two years after its Illinois Central decision, the Supreme
Court returned to the PTD in a case involving Pacific Coast tidelands. A
landowner with a federal Oregon Land Donation Act grant claimed
ownership of tidelands; a grantee of the state also claimed ownership. In
Shively v. Bowlby, the Supreme Court affirmed an Oregon Supreme Court
decision in favor of the state grantee, narrowly construing the scope of the
federal grant.66
Retracing the origins of the PTD and citing Hale, the Shively Court
distinguished private proprietary rights—the jus privatum—from
inalienable PTD rights—the jus publicum.67 The Court indicated that at
the time of the pre-statehood federal grant the federal government held the
tidelands in trust for the state, which would acquire them under equal
footing at statehood, and that the trust was “incidental to the sovereignty

62.
Id. at 455.
63.
Id. at 456.
64.
The two exceptions the Court recognized were (1) “for the
improvement of the navigation and use of the waters” (that is, for uses serving trust
purposes); or (2) “when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains” (that is, non-impairment of remaining trust resources). Id. at
453, 455–56.
65.
Professor Sax thought that Illinois Central established the “central
substantive thought” in PTD litigation: “When a state holds a resource which is
available for the free use of the general public, a court will look with considerable
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to relocate that
resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private
parties.” Sax, supra note 1, at 490 (emphasis in original).
66.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), aff’g Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P.
154 (Or. 1892).
67.
Id. at 11, 48–49 (citing Hale). Separating the jus privatum and the jus
publicum was conceptually significant because that distinction made clear private
lands burdened with the jus publicum could be trust lands.
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of the state.”68 Consequently, such pre-statehood federal grants would be
upheld only in exceptional circumstances.69 This pre-statehood federal
trust obligation indicates that the obligations imposed on the sovereign by
the PTD are not limited to states.
E. Establishing the Public Trust in Wildlife
In 1896, two years after Shively, the Court extended the PTD to
wildlife, upholding a Connecticut wildlife conservation statute that
prohibited birds killed during the hunting season from being transported
out of state.70 In Geer v. Connecticut, the Court, per Justice Edward White,
reviewed ancient and English common law principles of sovereign trust
ownership of air, water, sea, shores, stating that “[t]he power . . . lodged
in the State, resulting from the common ownership, is to be exercised, like
all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people . . .
”71 The state’s sovereign trust over wildlife was “an attribute of
government” to be exercised as a trust “represent[ing] its people, and the
ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty.”72
This trust was sufficient to sustain the state’s conservation
measure, as the Court announced that the state had “a duty . . . to enact
such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its
beneficial use in the future to the people of the state.”73 Geer’s recognition
of the state’s trust obligations concerning wildlife untethered the PTD from
navigability requirements, enabling states to extend trust obligations to
those resources in which “the whole people are interested,”74 not just
68.
Id. at 54. The Court explained that lands subject to equal footing “are
held by the United States for the benefit of the whole people . . . in trust for future
states.” Id. at 49.
69.
Pre-statehood grants are upheld only in cases fulfilling an
“international duty” or in the case of a “public exigency.” Id. at 49–50. Some have
succeeded, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997) (ruling that a Department
of Interior pre-statehood withdrawal of lands in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
included submerged lands, defeating an ensuing equal footing grant); Idaho v. United
States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (deciding that a pre-statehood grant of Lake Coeur
d’Alene within an Indian reservation defeated a subsequent equal footing grant). More
typically, equal footing has led the Court to conclude that pre-statehood grants did not
defeat equal footing; see, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193
(1987) (concerning a pre-statehood reservation of reservoir sites).
70.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), aff’g State v. Geer, 22 A.
1012 (Conn. 1891).
71.
Id. at 529.
72.
Id. at 527, 529.
73.
Id. at 534.
74.
Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 456 (1892).
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navigable waters. That untethering began almost simultaneously, in a
pathbreaking 1893 decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
F. The PTD Beyond Title Navigability
The growth of the scope of the PTD under the expanding
definition of navigability was soon accompanied by a surprising expansion
from the states, which disconnected the PTD from title navigability and
broadened the purposes of the doctrine. The bellwether case was Lamprey
v. Metcalf, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1893 rejected a state
claim of ownership of a dry lakebed on the ground that the lake was a
nonnavigable water at statehood.75
But in dicta that would be repeated by many other courts, the
court, per Justice William Mitchell,76 declared that states could define the
scope of public rights in waterways. He announced that navigable waters
were all those that were subject to recreational use, like “sailing, rowing,
fishing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even city
purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be
enumerated or even anticipated.”77 This broad conception of public rights
became foundational to the modern PTD. Justice Mitchell advised that a
broad definition of navigability was appropriate because “[t]o hand over
all these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow test, would
be a great wrong upon the public for all time.”78 This antimonopoly
sentiment has been a persistent theme in public trust litigation.79
Lamprey was widely quoted and followed by courts in other
states.80 Its recreational test for navigability is now the dominant state law
75.
53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893). An earlier case recognizing public rights
in waterbodies whose beds were not state-owned was Inhabitants of West Roxbury v.
Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158, 171–72 (1863), where the Supreme Judicial Court
ruled that the town of West Roxbury could not exclude the public from removing ice
blocks from a Great Pond because “[f]ishing, fowling, boating, bathing, skating, or
riding upon the ice, taking water for domestic or agricultural purposes, or for use in the
arts, and the cutting and taking of ice, are lawful and free upon these ponds . . .” Lamprey
cited West Roxbury, but since the latter involved an interpretation of colonial ordinances,
it had less influence on subsequent cases than Lamprey’s common law interpretation.
76.
The namesake of what is now Mitchell-Hamline Law School.
77.
Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143.
78.
Id. Although the quotes above were technically dicta, the court
applied them in State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 622 (Minn. 1914) (“Under the law of
this state the state owns the soil under public waters.”).
79.
See Blumm & Moses, supra note 39.
80.
See Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 442 (Or. 1918)
(concluding a small lagoon, capable of floating only small crafts, was navigable-infact); People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)
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interpretation, according to the leading water law treatise.81 Today, its
recognition that public rights exist on all waterways capable of supporting
recreational watercraft, regardless of bedland ownership82 has enlarged the
scope of the PTD considerably beyond the navigable waterways subject to
equal footing. In fact, the dichotomy between the scope of the PTD and
federal equal footing doctrine may have been what Justice Kennedy was
referring to in his PPL Montana v. Montana opinion when he suggested
that while title navigability under the equal footing doctrine was a federal
test, the PTD was a state-law doctrine.83 That observation has been
misconstrued by one court as meaning that the PTD does not apply to the
federal government.84 But the fact that the PTD has been considerably
enlarged by state law beyond waterbodies whose beds are title-navigable

(holding that waterways used for recreational purposes are navigable, citing
Lamprey); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (S.D. 1937) (“[W]hether or not
waters are navigable depends upon the natural availability of waters for public
purposes . . .” (citing Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143)); Roberts v. Taylor, 181 N.W. 622,
626 (N.D. 1921) (“A public use may not be confined entirely within a use for trade
purposes alone.” (emphasis omitted)); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 664–65
(Ark. 1980) (holding that a river was navigable because it could “be used for a
substantial portion of the year for recreational purposes”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843
(1980); Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17, 26 (Mo. 1954); Smart v. Aroostook Lumber
Co., 68 A. 527, 532 (Me. 1907); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519–
20 (Wis. 1952).
81.
2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 32.03(a)(1) (Amy K. Kelly ed. 3rd
ed. 2018) (discussing the so-called “pleasure boat” test).
82.
In some states, like Minnesota, the beds of waterways that are
recreationally navigable are jointly owned. State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 622 (Minn.
1914) (In a clear recognition of the distinction of the distinction between the jus
publicum and the jus privatum, the court stated “[u]nder the law of this state, the state
owns the soil under public waters in a sovereign, not a proprietary capacity, but the
state still owns it, and the shore owner does not.”).
83.
565 U.S. 576, 593 (2012) (deciding that Montana Supreme Court
misinterpreted the federal equal footing test for riverbed ownership by failing to apply
the “segment” rule to determine title-navigable waters).
84.
The D.C. district court in Alec L. v Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15
(D. D.C. 2012), misinterpreted Justice Kennedy’s dicta, 565 U.S. at 603, to mean that
the PTD was inapplicable to the federal government. The district court in Juliana v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1259 (D. Or. 2016) disagreed (“I can think of no
reason why the public trust doctrine, which came to this country through the Roman
and English roots of our civil system, would apply to the states but not to the federal
government.”), overruled on other grounds, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). For a
detailed evaluation of the district court’s decision in Juliana, see Michael C. Blumm
& Mary Christiana Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit:” Climate Change, Due Process,
and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017).
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should have no effect on the applicability of the PTD to the federal
sovereign.85
By 1970, when Sax wrote his article, some elements of the PTD—
including sovereigns’ obligation to hold certain natural resources (those in
which the “whole people” were interested86) in trust for the people,
including future generations—were well established, if unnamed. Others,
like the PTD’s application to wildlife and the role of states in expanding
the scope of the doctrine, were less well recognized87 but equally well
established.

IV. THE SAXION PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
At the dawn of what has been called “the heyday of the modern
environmental era,”88 Joe Sax’s The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention revived an ancient doctrine
providing citizens with a means to challenge government action or
inaction threatening so-called “trust resources,” traditionally navigable
waters and their bedlands.89 Sax’s resurrection of the public trust offered
a legal doctrine with what he believed had the “breadth and substantive
content” necessary to address modern natural resource management
problems.90 The article was groundbreaking, not only for its revival of an
historic, largely forgotten doctrine, but also, according to Professor Carol
Rose, for “unhook[ing] it from its traditional moorings on and around
water bodies.”91
Sax believed the public trust doctrine to be an “instrument for
democratization” that could inject a needed level of judicial skepticism
towards “dubious governmental conduct.”92 Professor Holly Doremus

85.
The argument for the application of the PTD to the federal
government is made in Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Shaffer, The Federal Public
Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45
ENVTL. L. 399 (2015).
86.
Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
87.
Indeed, Professor Sax’s article did not mention Geer v. Connecticut
or focus on Lamprey or its progeny.
88.
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW U. L. REV. 787, 788
(1993).
89.
Sax, supra note 1.
90.
Id. at 474.
91.
Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 352 (1998).
92.
Sax, supra note 1, at 491.
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described Sax as the “architect of the modern public trust doctrine,”93 and
by 2020 Sax’s article had been cited by 47 cases and 1184 articles.94 Even
the doctrine’s critics have acknowledged Sax’s article as the “truly
seminal” one.95
Sax gave only a brief history of the public trust doctrine’s journey
from Roman to English to American law, explaining the general rule that
states take the title to waterbeds up to the high water mark in “trusteeship”
for the public.96 He described the public trust as an inherent limit on
government authority tied to intrinsically important public interests, not a
property right granted to the public by the government.97 According to
Sax, trust assets like historic fishing and navigation were “so intrinsically
important to every citizen” that they warranted government protection
from private monopolization. Further, other assets “are so particularly
gifts of nature’s bounty” that they must remain accessible to all. Finally,
“certain uses have a peculiarly public nature that makes their adaptation to
private use inappropriate.”98 Sax construed several traditional public trust
cases99 to mean that the government cannot make a grant to a private party

93.
Holly Doremus, In Memorium: In Honor of Joe Sax: A Grateful
Appreciation, 39 VT. L. REV. 799, 801 (2015).
94.
Figures based on data from HeinOnline database, as of December 7,
2020.
95.
See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 23, at 339.
96.
Sax, supra note 1, at 475–76. Sax thought that how this trusteeship
restrained government dealings with the land was subject to some confusion. On the
one hand, the trusteeship may “put such lands wholly beyond the police power of the
state, making them inalienable and unchangeable in use.” Id. at 476–77. On the other
hand, the trusteeship may imply “nothing more than that state authority must be
exercised consistent with the general police power.” Id. The former describes a public
right that imposes a restraint on the government, while the latter implies no restraint
at all beyond the implicit restraint that police power be used for a public purpose. Id.
97.
Id. at 478–84.
98.
Id. at 485.
99.
State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R., N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio 1916)
(“An individual may abandon his private property, but a public trustee cannot.”);
Brickell v. Trammel, 559, 82 S. 221, 226 (Fla. 1919) (“States may . . . grant to
individuals limited privileges in the lands under navigable waters, but not so as to
divert them or the waters thereon from their proper uses for the public welfare.”);
People v. California Fish Co., 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913) (applying a more rigorous
standard of review than used to analyze conveyances by private parties);
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 74–75 (Mass. 1851) (state grants of riparian
land do not include the right to obstruct navigation); City of Milwaukee v. State, 193
Wis, 423, 451–52 (Wis. 1927) (upholding the state’s grant of a segment of Milwaukee
harbor land to a private steel company).
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if the effect of the grant meant that the government abdicated its authority
to govern.100
Sax famously anointed the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois
Central,101 as the “lodestar in American public trust law.”102 The Illinois
Central Court held the state legislature’s extensive grant of submerged
lands along the Chicago waterfront to a railroad was beyond the state’s
legislative power.103 The Court, per Justice Field, distinguished
government lands intended for sale to the public from those held in trust
and, according to Sax, established a principle of judicial skepticism at the
center of public trust doctrine litigation; according to Sax:
When a state holds a resource, which is available for the
free use of the general public, a court will look with
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct
which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to
more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the selfinterest of private parties.104
The Illinois Central Court viewed the legislature’s grant to be at odds with
the government’s duty to provide public services and benefits.105 For Sax,

100. Sax, supra note 1, at 488–89; Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which
the whole people are interested . . . so as to leave them entirely under the use and
control of private parties, . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”).
101. 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see supra notes 54–65 and accompanying text.
102. Sax, supra note 1, at 489.
103. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. There has always been some
question as to the effect of the Court’s decision on the conveyance at issue: Illinois
Central might be interpreted to make such grants voidable at the discretion of the state
(“Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which
the property was held by the state can be resumed at any time.”), id. at 455, or void,
wholly ineffective (“We hold, therefore, that any attempted cession of the ownership
and control of the State . . . was inoperative . . . .”). Id. at 460. The Court waffled on
the issue: “A grant of all lands under the navigable waters of a state has never been
adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would
be held, if not absolutely void on its face as subject to revocation.” Id. at 453. The
issue did not affect the result in the case because the state sued to void the 1869 grant.
104. Sax, supra note 1, at 490 (emphasis in original).
105. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 (“The state can no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people are interested, . . . than it can abdicate
its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the
peace.”).
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the case provided a foundation for courts to infuse some democratization
into public trust management decisions.106
Sax explored a series of contemporary cases that he maintained
adopted the skepticism that Illinois Central called for in reviewing suspect
public trust management decisions.107 He devoted close attention to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ decision Gould v. Greylock
Reservation Commission.108 The Greylock court resolved a controversy
over 9,000 acres of land purchased by the state for a public park on which
a legislatively-created agency wanted to lease to a resort developer to build
a ski development on 4,400 acres; about half of the park.109 Five citizens
challenged the decision, charging that the legislation authorizing the park
development was invalid. Although the court avoided invalidating the
statute, it reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the case and struck down
the lease and management agreement after a close examination of each.110
According to the court, the Greylock Reservation, as a state park, could
not be “diverted to another inconsistent public use without plain and
explicit legislation to that end.”111 The court consequently held that the
management agreement impermissibly delegated the agency’s
responsibility to manage the park and also found “no express grant to the
[agency] of power to permit use of public lands . . . for what seems, in part
at least, a commercial venture for private profit.”112
The Gould court never used explicit public trust language, but Sax
maintained that the court imposed a “presumption that the state does not
ordinarily intend to divert trust properties in such a manner as to lessen
public uses.”113 By requiring “express legislative authority,” the
Massachusetts court increased the transparency of public trust resource
management in effect democratizing the policymaking process by
insisting on express legislative approvals of conveyances of trust assets,
even leases.114
Although in 1970 the scope of the public trust seemed narrowly
confined to navigable waters, Sax contended that the limitations imposed
106. Sax, supra note 1, at 491 (“The model for judicial skepticism that
[Illinois Central] built poses a set of relevant standards for current, less dramatic
instances of dubious governmental conduct.”).
107. Id. at 491–556.
108. 350 Mass. 410 (1966).
109. Id. at 411–12; see Sax, supra note 1, at 492–93.
110. 350 Mass. at 427.
111. Id. at 419.
112. Id. at 426 (This anti-commercial sentiment is also found in the Hawaii
Supreme Court’s decision in Waiahole Ditch, infra note 201 and accompanying text.).
113. Sax, supra note 1, at 494.
114. Id. at 496.
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by the PTD could be applied “in a wide range of situations in which diffuse
public interests need protection against tightly organized groups with clear
and immediate goals,”115 in effect providing an antidote to agency capture
by special interests.116 Gould was just one of many cases examined by
Sax117 in which courts closely scrutinized agency decisions in order to
protect trust resources.118 Courts had crafted what Sax called “the
phenomenon of indirect intervention;”119 that is, imposing procedural
requirements rather than inserting themselves in the decision-making
process by addressing the merits of a public trust claim, which could create
separation-of-powers issues.120 In other words, courts resorted to a
115. Id. at 556.
116. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation,
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
117. See Priewe v. Wis. State Land and Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918
(Wis. 1896); In re Trempealeau Drainage Dist.: Merwin v. Houghton, 131 N.W. 838
(Wis. 1911); In re Crawford Cty. Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874 (Wis.
1924), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 598 (1924); City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820
(Wis. 1927); State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957); City of Madison
v. State, 83 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 1957); City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 97 N.W.2d 513,
(Wis. 1959); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 53 N.W.2d 514, reh’g, 261 Wis. 515c
(Wis. 1952); People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576 (Cal. 1913); Marks v. Whitney,
276 Cal. App. 2d 72, 80 Cal. Rptr. 606 (Cal. 1969), petition for reh’g granted, Civil
No. 24,883 (Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1969); People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation
and Dev. Comm’n v. Town of Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533 (Cal. 1968); Miramar Co.
v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 170 (Cal. 1943); Ventura Port Dist. v. Taxpayers,
Prop. Owners, Citizens & Electors, 53 Cal. 2d 227 (Cal. 1959); Martin v. Smith, 184
Cal. App. 2d 571 (Cal. 1960); Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407
(1958); People v. City of Long Beach, 51 Cal. 2d 875 (Cal. App. 1959); City of Long
Beach v. Marshall, 11 Cal. 2d 609 (1938); Rogers v. City of Mobile, 169 So. 2d 282
(Ala. 1964); Texas Oyster Growers Ass’n v. Odom, 385 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1965); Parks v. Simpson, 137 So. 2d 136 (Miss. 1962).
118. Looking at Wisconsin, Sax claimed its courts “developed two useful
approaches . . . First, . . . specif[ying] criteria by which state dealings with such lands
may be judged . . . Second, . . . recogniz[ing] that trust lands are of statewide concern
and that authority to deal with them cannot be delegated by the state legislature to any
group which is less broadly based. In this manner, [the judiciary] has fulfilled its
function as an ensurer of the efficacy of the democratic process.” Sax, supra note 1,
at 523. Turning to California, he found its courts to be “in accord with historic patterns
elsewhere, utilizing the public trust concept to constrain activities which significantly
shift public values into private uses or uses which benefit some limited group.” Id. at
538. He contended that “[i]ndeed, it seems fair to describe the evolution of much
public trust law in the United States as an effort to retreat from the excessive
generosity of early legislatures and public land management agencies.” Id. at 547.
119. Id. at 558–559.
120. Id. at 558. Procedural requirements, of course, would soon be
imposed on federal agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
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legislative remand, requiring “a truly representative body” to “openly and
explicitly” justify a public trust management decision.121 In public trust
cases, the legislative remand served to democratize the process by,
according to Sax, “remanding . . . after public opinion has been
aroused.”122 This principle of public accountability fulfilled what Sax
thought was the court’s fundamental function in disputes involving public
trust resources.123
Sax observed that a public trust principle of judicial skepticism is
“properly invoked principally to deal with issues which . . . tend to be made
at low-visibility levels.”124 He gave an example of a highway agency
holding poorly attended public hearings due to poorly publicized public
notice of its development plans affecting in a large geographic area.125 In
such a case, “a diffuse majority is made subject to the will of a concerted
minority.”126 Often, this sort of imbalance occurs when the government:
(1) conveys public trust resources at less than market value for no obvious
reason;127 (2) grants an exclusive usufruct in public trust resources to a
private entity, undermining broad public use;128 or (3) reallocates diffuse
public uses to private or narrower public uses.129 A variation on the third
example was whether the resource in question is being used for its natural
purpose, such as, in Sax’s words, “a lake being used ‘as a lake.’”130 In all of
these situations, a legislative remand “serves to call attention to the
inadequacies in conventional public techniques for evaluating resource
decisions involving diffuse public uses.”131 In an effort to elucidate the
judiciary’s role in promoting rational natural resource management, Sax’s
article “added a powerful, if controversial, rhetorical element”132 to natural
resources law.
Ten years after his 1970 article Sax, dissatisfied with the PTD’s
confinement to a limitation on alienation of narrowly-defined trust
property, authored a follow-up article: Liberating the Public Trust from its
U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012). See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW &
LITIGATION (Environmental Law Series 2d, 2019 ed.).
121. Sax, supra note 1, at 559.
122. Id. at 560.
123. Id. at 561.
124. Id. at 559 n.268.
125. Id. at 558.
126. Id. at 560.
127. Id. at 562.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 563.
130. Id. at 565.
131. Id. at 564.
132. See Rose, supra note 91, at 352.
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Historical Shackles.133 He described the essence of property law as “a
respect for reasonable expectations.”134 In other words, “stability in
ownership is what we protect with property rights.”135 Importantly, this
stability was not meant to foreclose change, but instead provided for a
transition rather than a collapse.136 As applied to environmental problems,
change in use itself is not the problem, but rather a destabilizing rate of
change.137 In Sax’s view, the public trust doctrine functions to “protect
such public expectations against destabilizing changes.”138 With this
perspective, the public trust doctrine can “embrace a much wider range of
things than private ownership,”139 expanding the concepts of jus publicum
and jus privitum to a variety of natural resources management issues.
To liberate the public trust doctrine from its historical navigation
shackles, Sax explored the “tradition of the commons in medieval
Europe.”140 In feudal times, “as the common use of uncultivated areas
became customary, it was natural for these customary uses to be described
as legally compelled and required by justice.”141 Sax described the
commons as an “agrarian economy of the forest”142 that was capable of
thwarting a nascent capitalist ethos by allowing access for peasants to
subsist on the unenclosed lands.143 He also noted that the commons arose
from customary law, which is not unchanging.144 The commons was often
conveyed to private use, but private title did not always exclude the
public’s common use.145 Disputes over the use of the commons were not

133. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its
Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980).
134. Id. at 186–87.
135. Id. at 188.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.; see Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private
Property: The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649 (2010)
(explaining that the PTD did not aim to obliterate private property but coexist with it
through what the article labeled the accommodation principle).
139. Sax, Liberating, supra note 133, at 189.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 190. See McGraw, supra note 35.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 189.
145. Id. at 191.
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usually over title or custom, but instead “the sharp disappointment of
expectations,”146 such as a peasant’s loss of subsistence.147
In the modern era, Sax analogized this antipathy to destabilizing
change by pointing to City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda
County,148 a decision of the California Supreme Court that resolved a
longstanding dispute over San Francisco Bay tidelands, much of which the
legislature had conveyed to private parties in the late 19th century.149
Overruling previous decisions which declared the conveyances to be free
of the public trust, the court held that the PTD burdened private tidelands
that remained unfilled and unimproved tidelands.150 However, tracts
already filled and improved and no longer adaptable for trust uses were
free of the trust,151 a signature example of the PTD’s accommodation
principle.152
Although the Mono Lake153 controversy was still in the lower
courts when he wrote, Sax anticipated that the notion of destabilizing
change could prove influential in that decision, citing the impending
ecological disaster from Los Angeles DWP’s export of the lake’s water.154
His call for a judicial remand to the more representative branches of
government was effectively answered by the California Supreme Court’s
decision requiring longstanding private uses of water to be balanced
against equally longstanding public uses (though unrecognized by legal
protection) in a PTD analysis protecting the reasonable expectations of
diffuse interests.155
146. Id. at 191–92.
147. See Connor McDermott, Monopolizers of the Soil: The Commons as
a Source of Public Trust Responsibilities, 61 NAT. RES. J. ___ (forthcoming 2020),
SSRN, Feb. 19, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3540669.
148. 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).
149. Id. at 363.
150. Id.
151. The court accounted for both actual public use of tidal lands and a
grantee’s 100-year chain of title to create a remedy accommodating both, despite there
being “no doctrinal basis for recognizing these values.” Id.
152. See Blumm, supra note 138, at 665–66 (“The accommodation
principle . . . has become the chief characteristic of the public trust doctrine's effect on
private property.”).
153. Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Sup. Ct. of Alpine Cnty., 33 Cal.3d 419 (Cal.
1983).
154. Sax, supra note 133, at 192.
155. Sax’s observations from the feudal era were not an effort to apply the
doctrine of custom to American law, but instead to shine light on the power that
expectations and destabilization can have on property law. Id. at 192–93. He hoped to
imbue the public trust doctrine with the lesson of customary law. “[T]he fact of
expectations rather than some formality is central.” Id. at 193. Title is not irrelevant,
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V. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE HALF-CENTURY AFTER SAX
In the years since Sax wrote, the PTD has expanded considerably
both in terms of the definition protected trust purposes and trust properties
(the trust res). Some illustrative examples of this expansion are discussed
below, including case law and statutes involving upland resources like
beaches, Western water rights, groundwater, oil and gas revenues, and the
atmosphere.
A. New Jersey Beaches: The Public Trust Upland
One of the first jurisdictions to expand the scope of the PTD in the
wake of Sax’s article was New Jersey, the American homeland of the
doctrine.156 The state’s beaches have long been in high public demand for
recreation.157 Overcrowded beaches led some New Jersey municipalities
to charge access fees, which the state legislature authorized.158
In 1970, the year of Sax’s article, the Borough of Avon-By-theSea began charging non-residents considerably higher fees to access its
publicly owned beach than residents.159 A neighboring municipality, the
Borough of Neptune, objected and filed suit, claiming that that all residents
of the state had a right to use public beaches to reach the ocean.160 After
the lower courts upheld the higher non-resident fees, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed, recognizing that the claim was “in essence . . . a
reliance on the public trust doctrine.”161 Citing to Sax’s article for the
proposition that the doctrine applied to recreational use of beaches
necessary to reach publicly-owned tidelands and the ocean, the court ruled
that the PTD prevented the charging of discriminatory fees to non-

but “where title and expectations are not congruent, title should carry less weight.” Id.
Sax mentioned that courts may protect “rights of private property owners and their
rightful expectations;” however, with public trust claims, when the expectations are
so diffusely held, courts have been less willing to directly interfere. Id.
156. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 42 (1821); see generally supra
notes 46–50 and accompanying text (discussing Arnold v. Mundy).
157. See, e.g., Borough of Neptune v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294
A.2d 47, 49 (N.J. 1972) (“Avon’s year-round population of 1850, resident within its
approximately seven square block area, is increased in the summertime to about 5500
people (not counting day visitors).”).
158. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:61-22-20 (West).
159. See Neptune, 294 A.2d at 51.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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residents.162 Although the case involved a public beach, the court signaled
it might be open to extending public rights to privately owned beaches,
suggesting that privatization of beaches might not relieve their owners of
public trust obligations.163
Over a decade later, the New Jersey Supreme Court revisited the
beach access issue and extended the PTD to a beach owned by a “quasipublic” nonprofit corporation.164 In Mathews v. Bay Head Improvement
Association, the court recognized two distinct public rights as ancillary to the
public’s ownership of tidelands and the ocean: (1) reasonable access through
the beaches to reach the tidelands and ocean, and (2) reasonable enjoyment of
the dry sand area.165 But not all beaches had public rights, according to the
court’s decision, because the PTD warranted an accommodation between
public access and private beach ownership.166 The court consequently
established a formula for determining which New Jersey beaches had public
access rights. The court introduced a four-part balancing test to ascertain
whether public rights burdened the state’s beaches, depending on (1) the
location of the dry sand area in relation to the tidelands, (2) the extent and
availability of nearby public beaches, (3) the nature and extent of public
demand, and (4) the past usage of the area by the owner.167 Using these socalled Matthews factors, courts could recognize public trust rights in New
Jersey’s uplands.

162. Id. at 54–55 (citing Sax, supra note 1, at 556, 565). The court ruled
that although municipalities can charge access fees, they may not discriminate against
non-residents. Id. at 55. In an ensuing decision, holding that a municipally-owned
beach resort controlling beach access could not limit its membership to local residents,
the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument than the PTD did not
extend beyond the high-water mark of ocean tidelands. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal,
393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978).
163. Neptune, 294 A.2d at 54 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11
(1894)), on the distinction between the jus privatum and the jus publicum and stating
that “[i]t may be that some such prior conveyances [of beaches] constituted an
improper alienation of trust property or at least they are impliedly impressed with
certain obligations on the grantee to the use of the conveyed land consistently with the
public rights therein.”
164. Matthews v. Bay Head, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). The Bay Head
Improvement Association, a non-profit corporation, owned six of the 76 beach lots
involved in the case and managed beach access to all. Membership in Bay Head was
limited to residents of the borough, including non-beach owners. Id. at 369.
165. Id. at 364–65.
166. Id. at 365. On the trust doctrine’s “accommodation principle,” see
Blumm, supra note 138 (supplying numerous examples of accommodation between
public trust and private property rights).
167. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.
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In 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the Matthews
factors in Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club, in
which a member of the beach association defended a charge of trespass for
using Atlantis’ private beach.168 After a trial court granted the association
a three-foot wide easement on the beach to reach the high-water mark, an
appeals court extended the public rights to use the entire dry sand area and
upheld the charging of reasonable fees, and the supreme court affirmed.169
Applying the Mathews factors, the court (1) observed that the location of
the beach provided easy access for pedestrians, (2) pointed to the limited
availability of other public beaches, (3) noted the widespread public
interest in New Jersey beaches, and (4) considered the fact that the beach
had free access to Raleigh Beach prior to 1996.170 All four factors weighed
in favor of public access.
Subsequent cases included the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 2010
affirmation that no constitutional taking occurred in a state beach
nourishment case.171 And in 2012, an appeals court upheld a lower court
decision that voided an agreement between the state and private beach
clubs restricting public access on the restored beach as inconsistent with
the public trust doctrine.172
B. Mono Lake: Water Rights and the Public Trust
Implementation of the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power’s (DWP) second aqueduct transporting water from the Mono Basin
to Los Angeles under water rights granted by the state in 1940 led to a
decision that Sax anticipated.173 The increased diversions consumed nearly
168. 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
169. See id. at 118.
170. Id. at 121–22.
171. City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 532 (N.J. 2010). The
court affirmed lower court decisions that the Long Branch nourishment was an
avulsion, meaning that land ownership boundaries did not change, and that the Liu’s
claimed taking was actually PTD land, so there was no government taking. Id. at 551,
553, 555.
172. Chisea v. D. Lobi Enterprises, No. C-296-06, 2012 WL 4464382
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Sept. 28, 2012).
173. See Sax, supra note 133, at 192; DWP completed a second aqueduct
in 1970 which would allow the full flow of four of the five feeder streams to Mono
Lake. The state granted the original permit in 1940, despite acknowledging anticipated
adverse effects to Mono Lake, based on the understanding that the decision was
required by the water code, which puts domestic use as the highest use of water. State
of California, State Water Resources Control Board, Decision 1631, Decision and
Order Amending Water Right Licenses to Establish Fishery Protection Flows in
Streams Tributary to Mono Lake and to Protect Public Trust Resources at Mono Lake
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all of the flow of four of the five feeder streams that provided inflow to
Mono Lake, causing the lake’s surface area to decrease by one-third and
imperiling the ecology and scenic beauty of the lake.174
After failing in the lower courts, the National Audubon Society
won a landmark decision in 1983 when a unanimous California Supreme
Court decided that the PTD applied to common law water rights,175 and
therefore the DWP diversions had to be evaluated by the state under trust
principles.176 Although the PTD did not require a cessation of all the Mono
Basin diversions, the diversions were cut back significantly until the state
could produce a PTD-compliant decision on the ecological effects of the
second-aqueduct diversions.177 The state took eleven years to do so; its
1994 plan envisioned restoration of about half of the elevation decline the
lake suffered since the state granted DWP’s water rights in 1940, only a
quarter of which had been restored by 2020.178
The Mono Lake decision was significant for several reasons
beyond averting an ecological calamity at the lake. The court applied the
PTD to existing water rights for the first time, recognizing that the public
trust antedated any state water right. This recognition, however, did not
result in the court applying the prior appropriation law principle of first-

and in the Mono Lake Basin (1994), https://www.monobasinresearch.org/images/
legal/d1631text.php; see also Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public
Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473 (1989); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights,
and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 269 (1990).
174. Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Sup. Ct. of Alpine Cty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d
709, 711 (Cal. 1983) (“The ultimate effect of continued diversions is a matter of
intense dispute, but there seems little doubt that both the scenic beauty and the
ecological values of Mono Lake are imperiled.”).
175. The court stated that the PTD and state water rights were “parts of an
integrated system of water law.” Id. at 732 (proceeding to provide the California Water
Resources Control Board with a framework to incorporate the PTD into water
allocation decision making).
176. Id. at 727.
177. Not until 1989 were diversions from Mono Lake reduced, due to a
preliminary injunction ordered by the Superior Court of El Dorado County. DWP did
not export any water from Mono Lake following the injunction until the 1994 state
water board’s decision allocating instream flows. Decision 1631, supra note 179.
178. The Water Resources Control Board’s 1994 decision amended
DWP’s water rights in order to allow Mono Lake to return to an elevation level of
6,392 above sea-level, about 25 feet below pre-diversion levels plan, but significantly
higher than they were in 1983, when the state supreme court decided the case. As of
January 1, 2020, the level of the lake was recorded at 6,382.5 feet above sea level, still
9.5 feet below the state’s goal but over 15 feet higher than they were at the time of the
court’s decision. The Mono Lake Committee, Mono Lake Level,
https://www.monolake.org/today/water (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).
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in-time,179 which would have allocated all the water to trust uses. Instead,
the court adopted a kind of equitable apportionment under which the state
would exercise “continuous supervisory control” to ensure consideration
of both the economic and ecological effects of actions on trust resources.180
The court emphasized that the state legislature had “the power to grant
usufructuary licenses . . . even though this taking does not promote, and
may unavoidably harm trust uses” to maintain diversions central to the
economy of the state, such as continued transboundary transfers from
northern California streams south.181 On the other hand, the decision made
clear that there are no vested water rights in the state; all water rights are
subject to the PTD.182 The result is that water rights in California are
subject to administrative reconsideration using trust principles.
The California Supreme Court also affirmed the principle that the
public trust included recreational and ecological purposes and must be
“sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs.”183 These
needs included “the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the
air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds.”184 Moreover,
the court upheld broad citizen standing, proclaiming that “any member of
the general public has standing to raise a claim of public harm to the public
trust.”185
The Mono Lake decision significantly expanded the scope of the
PTD by including non-navigable tributaries that affect navigable waters,
as defined by state law.186 A recent application of that “affectation
179. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727. See Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case,
the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099,
1101 (2012) (finding no widespread ensuing case law on the PTD).
180. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 727. The state has “an affirmative duty to
take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources,
and to protect public trust uses wherever feasible.” Id.
181. Id.
182. The court stated that the state may reconsider and reallocate water
rights when taking into account diversions affecting the Mono Lake environment. Id.
at 727; see Owen, supra note 179, at 1105 (discussing that the effect of the Mono Lake
decision on the state water agency, despite a lack of ensuing case law).
183. 658 P.2d at 719, relying on Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380
(Cal. 1971).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 716 n.11, citing Marks, 491 P.2d at 797.
186. 658 P.2d at 720. In 1989, the California Court of Appeal interpreted
the state’s Fish and Game Code to require protection of the fish in the Mono Lake
feeder streams, effectively establishing minimum flow requirements. Cal. Trout v.
Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The California Supreme
Court subsequently interpreted this decision, in conjunction with its earlier Mono Lake
decision on water rights, to establish two PTDs in the state: a statutory one for fish
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principle” extended PTD protection to California groundwater where its
pumping affected a navigable surface water.187 Groundwater is subject to
the PTD in Hawaii without the condition of showing an effect on navigable
waters, as illustrated by the next case.
C. Waiahole Ditch: Groundwater in Trust
The PTD in Hawaii, first judicially recognized in 1899,188 was
incorporated into the Hawaiian Constitution in 1978.189 The Hawai’i
Supreme Court interpreted the constitutional language to include
groundwater exports from windward to leeward Oahu in the so-called
Waiahole Ditch case in 2000.190 The exports began in 1913 in order to
irrigate sugar cane, but the sugar production ended in 1995, prompting the
Hawaiian Water Rights Commission to hold a contested case hearing over
continued exports.191 In a 1997 decision, the Commission acknowledged a
public trust duty and allocated roughly half of the water in the ditch to

and wildlife, and a common law one for water rights. Envtl. Protection Info. Ctr. v.
Cal. Dept of Forestry & Fire Prevention, 187 P.3d 888, 926 (Cal. 2008). Wildlife are
expressly part of the public trust in California, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v.
FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr.3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); in Oregon, Kramer v. City
of Lake Oswego, 446 P.3d 1, 12 n.12 (Or. 2019); and in most other states. See Blumm
& Paulson, 2013 UTAH L. REV 1., at app. (cataloguing 47 states’ declarations of the
public trust in wildlife).
187. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal.Rptr.3d
393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), aff’g Superior Court, Sacramento County, No.
34201080000583 (2014).
188. King v. Oahu, Railway & Land Co, 11 Haw. 117, 125 (Haw. 1899)
(“[T]he people of Hawaii hold the absolute rights to all its navigable waters and the
soils under them for their own common use. The lands under the navigable waters in
and around the territory of the Hawaiian government are held in trust for the public
uses of navigation.”).
189. Haw. Const., Art. XI, §1: “For the benefit of present and future
generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s
natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy
resources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a
manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of
the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the
people.”
190. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409
(Haw. 2000); see Symposium, Managing Hawaii’s Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U.
HAWAI’I L. REV. 1 (2001).
191. See id. at 423–25.
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leeward agriculture and the rest to instream flow.192 The Hawai’i Supreme
Court reversed.193
The court provided a veritable treatise on the Hawaiian PTD,
explaining in some detail both the scope and substance of the doctrine.
First dispelling the state’s claim that the state water code subsumed the
PTD, the court explained that the state has powers and duties that it cannot
legislatively abrogate.194 One of these was the PTD, an “inherent attribute
of sovereign authority that the government . . . cannot surrender.”195
Instead of the PTD being subsumed by the water code, the court used the
public trust as means of interpreting the code, defining its limits, and
“justify[ing] its existence.”196 The court declared that the PTD applied to
both ground and surface water, discounted the lack of historic groundwater
use by Native Hawaiians, and announced the flexibility of the doctrine as
capable responding “to changing needs and circumstances.”197
The court explained the first duty of the sovereign trustee was to
protect public waterbodies for public access and use, including traditional
public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing, as well as recreation
and preserving waters in their natural state.198 But the court also
recognized that there was tension between non-consumptive trust uses and
consumptive water uses, particularly domestic drinking water, a trust
purpose, as well as Native Hawaiian customary uses, also trust uses.199
The court emphatically rejected the notion that economic
development was a trust use.200 Although the state could permissibly
consider the economic benefits of private water diversions, the court
emphasized that the commission’s PTD duty was “to maintain the purity
of flow of our waters for future generations and to assure that waters of our

192. See id. at 430 (allocating roughly 14 million gallons per day (gpd) for
leeward agriculture and 13 million gpd for instream uses).
193. At the time, the Hawai’i Supreme Court had jurisdiction over
Commission decision appeals.
194. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d. at 442–43.
195. Id. at 443.
196. Id. at 445.
197. Id. at 445–47.
198. Id. at 448, citing Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
452 (1892).
199. Id. at 448–49.
200. Id. at 450. The court observed that for the PTD to have meaning and
effect, public rights in trust resources must be recognized as distinct and superior to
competing private interests. Id. (“[I]f the public trust is to retain any meaning and
effect, it must recognize enduring public rights in trust resources separate from, and
superior to, the prevailing private interests in the resources at any given time.”).
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land are put to reasonable and beneficial uses.”201 Fulfilling the trust
requires that “any balancing between public and private purposes begin
with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment.”202
Consequently, private commercial uses require a higher level of judicial
scrutiny, with the burden on the private interest to justify the use.203 Since
judicial review of trust resources decisions “provides a level of protection
against improvident dissipation of an improvident res,” Hawaiian courts
must take a “close look” at legislative or administrative decisions to ensure
compliance with the trust.204
In a pathbreaking interpretation of the PTD, the Hawai’i Supreme
Court announced that the doctrine included the “precautionary principle,”
under which the government trustee must not wait for scientific certainty
to take remedial action to protect trust resources.205 In fact, the court urged
the Commission to adopt “margins of safety” for instream uses.206
The court sent the case back to the Commission, and the case
bounced around between the Commission and the court for several years.
Then, a 2006 Commission decision reserved roughly equal proportions
between the windward and leeward users of around 12 million gallons per
day (mgd) each, with the remaining 2.47 mgd instream until needed for
out-of-stream diversions, which prompted a dissent.207 In 2010, the
201. Id. (emphasis in original). The dual nature of the commission’s duties
is due to the Hawaiian constitutional language, which requires the state to “conserve
and protect” Hawai’i’s natural resources and “promote the development and
utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and the
self-sufficiency of the State.” HAW. CONST., art. XI, § 1.
202. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 442. The court singled out three priority
trust uses of Hawai’i’s waters: (1) domestic uses; (2) Native Hawaiian customary uses;
and (3) maintenance of waters in their natural state. Id. at 448–49. Drinking water for
domestic use is the highest priority use because of “founding principles of the ancient
Hawaiian system.” Id. at 451.
203. Id. at 453. The court noted that although the Commission’s decisions
enjoy a presumption of validity, interpreting the obligations imposed by the PTD is a
judicial function because PTD decisions are analogous to the duties imposed on
private trustees, except that the beneficiaries are present and future generations. Id. at
143.
204. Id. at 455 (citing Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassel,
837 P.2d 158, 168–69 (Ariz. App. 1991); and Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle
Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Idaho 1983)).
205. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 468.
206. Id.
207. See Hawaiian Water Commission Splits Over Waiahole Water Case,
Earthjustice (July 14, 2006), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2006.hawai-i-water
-commission-splits-over-waiahole-water-case. The dissent thought the 2.47 mgd
should remain in the stream as a margin of safety, as called for by the supreme court.
Id.
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Hawaiian Court of Appeals upheld most of the Commission’s decision in
rejecting a challenge by windward parties to two water rights the
Commission granted to developer while upholding a challenge to a permit
to a defunct golf course.208 Pending approval of more off-stream
diversions, the leeward streams received a total water allocation of over
15 mgd of a total of an average of about 27 mdg in the Waiahole Ditch
system.209
D. Pennsylvania Oil and Gas in Trust
The Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) to
the state constitution, approved in 1971 by an overwhelming 4–1 popular
vote, called for a citizens’ right to a clean environment, referred to the
208. In the Matter of Water Use Permit Applications . . . For the Waiahole
Ditch Combined Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-OA95-1 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 13,
2010). See Restore Steam Flow, EARTHJUSTICE (Apr. 10, 2014),
https://earthjustice.org/features/restore-stream-flow.
209. See Regina Gregory, Waiahole Ditch Reservation, EcoTipping Points
Project, July 2018, http://ecotippingpoints.org/our-stories/indepth/use-hawaii
-waihole-ditch-water-restoration.html. The Hawaiian Supreme Court has issued at
least two other two significant PTD decisions concerning Hawaiian waters since its
original Waiahole Ditch decision. In re Waiola O Molokai, 83 P.3d 664 (Haw. 2004),
largely upheld the state water commission’s decision to issue a water use permit to
Molokai Ranch for over 650,000 gallons per day of groundwater pumping to
implement a 30-year plan to develop low-impact tourism and light industry, along
with the company’s agricultural and ranching operations. The court concluded that the
Commission’s decision had fulfilled its PTD duty in balancing the competing
demands for groundwater, but the court faulted the commission for failing to require
Molokai Ranch to affirmatively show that its proposed use would not interfere with
Department of Hawaiian Homes groundwater wells on the island. Id. at 694–95. Local
opposition to the ranch’s development plans subsequently stalled the project, and in
2017 the ranch was put up for sale, but it had not sold by 2019. See Gina Mangieri,
Molokai Ranch sale has community talking public, private options, KHON2 (Feb. 2,
2019), https://www.khon2.com/news/always-investigating/molokai-ranch-sale-has
-community-talking-public-private-options. In a second case, Kauai Springs v.
Planning Comm’n of County of Kauai, 324 P.3d 951 (Haw. 2014), the Hawaiian
Supreme Court upheld the county’s decision to shut down Kauai Springs’ water
bottling operations due to violations of county zoning ordinances, reversing a contrary
circuit court decision. The supreme court ruled that the county planning commission
had authority under the PTD to investigate Kauai Springs’ bottling operations for
commercial use, and the doctrine imposed an affirmative duty on the company to
demonstrate that its use was not harming trust uses like drinking water or other
domestic uses, Native Hawaiian customary uses, maintenance of waters in their
natural state, and existing lawful reservations of water. Id. at 982. See generally Ana
Ching, Charting the Boundaries of Hawaii’s Public Trust Doctrine Post-Waiahole
Ditch (draft, 2020).
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state’s public natural resources as common property of all the people,
including future generations, and expressly recognized the state as trustee
of the state’s resources with an obligation to conserve and maintain
them.210 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court quickly undercut the
ERA in a case concerning a street widening project that consumed some
parkland in 1973 by ruling that all the ERA required was (1) compliance
with applicable statutes, (2) a reasonable effort to reduce environmental
harm to a minimum, and (3) the harm “clearly outweigh” the benefits of
proposed projects.211 Although the state supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, the high court never adopted the Commonwealth Court’s
three-part reasoning, and in two recent decisions involving oil and gas
production overturned the test.
In 2012, the state legislature amended the state Oil and Gas Act to
permit “optimal development” of oil and gas in response to a widespread
boom in production caused by hydraulic fracturing.212 The amendments
displaced local zoning restrictions in favor of a statewide “use of right”
everywhere, including residential, commercial, and industrial zones.213
Citizens and local governments challenged the amendments as violating
the state’s PTD, and a plurality of the state supreme court agreed.214
Four years later, a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
invoked the reasoning of the Robinson plurality in reversing the
Commonwealth Court’s reluctance to interfere with state legislative

210. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27: “The people have a right to clean air, pure
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generation yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”
211. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 361
A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
212. See 58 PA.C.S. §§ 2301–3504 (West 2012).
213. See Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 914–15 (Pa. 2013).
214. Id. at 981–82 (deciding that the amendments were incompatible with
the ERA because “the degradation of the corpus of the natural resources trust, having
disparate impact” on some citizens, violated the state’s fiduciary duties of prudence,
loyalty, and impartiality); see also id. at 957 (discussing the fiduciary duties of
prudence, loyalty, and impartiality). The plurality based its opinion on the PTD
embodied in § 27 of the state constitution, although—of perhaps greater interest
outside Pennsylvania—the court also noted that the PTD was enforceable under Art.
I, § 1 of the constitution, which recognizes and preserves citizens’ inherent rights, id.
at 948. A concurrence based its finding of unconstitutionality on substantive due
process. Id. at 1001 (Baer, J. concurring). For a thorough discussion of the Robinson
Township decision, see John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional
Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463, 478–517 (2015).

34

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 44

appropriation decisions.215 In response to budget shortfalls, the state had
redirected some $335 million from funds generated by oil and gas leases—
funds that had been earmarked for natural resources conservation—to the
state’s general fund.216 The court ruled that the fund was part of the corpus
of the public trust, and that the state’s fiduciary obligations required the
state to use the fund only for natural resources conservation.217 The court
also confirmed that the ERA was self-executing without the need for
implementing legislation.218 Thus, the state’s use of trust assets for nontrust purposes was “a clear violation of the most basic of a trustee’s
fiduciary obligations.”219 Applying the PTD to a legislative appropriation
decision was unprecedented, and the invocation of private trust principles
was potentially groundbreaking.220
E. The Atmospheric Trust Cases
In a group of cases perhaps beyond Sax’s 1970’s vision, the
nonprofit group Our Children’s Trust has coordinated a series of domestic
and international suits in an effort to force governments to curb greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions.221 The suits claim that unregulated GHG emissions
damage trust resources, including the atmosphere and affected
waterbodies, and that governments have inherent duties to protect those
resources for present and future generations. This section surveys both
domestic and international suits.

215. Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, 161
A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017) (relying on Robinson Township).
216. Id. at 930–32.
217. Id. at 933–35, 937–38.
218. Id. at 937–38. The court determined that royalties from oil and gas
production are part of the corpus of the trust but sent back to the lower courts to
determine whether rents and bonus bids are similarly part of the corpus. Id. at 935.
219. Id. at 939.
220. Id. at 931 n.23 (applying duties of prudence and loyalty). On the role
of private trust principles in public trust decision-making, see John C. Dernbach, The
Role of Trust Law Principles in Defining Public Trust Duties to Natural Resources,
54 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 77 (2020) (suggesting that the duties of conservation
easement trustees are more appropriate for interpreting the PTD than private trustee
duties).
221. See Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation Across the
World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST, chap. 6 (Ken Coghill,
Charles Sampford & Tim Smith, eds., 2012); Our Children’s Trust,
ourchildrenstrust.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) (cataloguing ongoing proceedings in
all 50 states and in over a dozen countries).
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1. U.S. Cases
Results of atmospheric trust cases in the U.S. to date have been
mixed. A federal district court rejected one suit because it decided that the
PTD did not apply to the federal government.222 The court misinterpreted
a federal Supreme Court opinion in a case that did not involve a PTD claim
at all.223 A Texas state court vacated a lower court decision in favor of PTD
plaintiffs for lack of standing on the ground that neither the state
Administrative Procedure Act nor the Water Code provided for judicial
review of the denial of a petition for rulemaking to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality.224
The signature case upholding an atmospheric trust litigation
(ATL) claim is the federal District Court of Oregon’s decision in Juliana
v. United States, denying the federal government’s motion to dismiss the
case.225 The court held that if the youth plaintiffs could show that the
government knew for a half-century about the dangers of GHG emissions
in the atmosphere and did nothing to prevent the danger,226 the plaintiffs
could prevail on a claim that their constitutional and public trust rights had
been violated.227

222. Alec L v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012). The district
court decision was affirmed in an unpublished opinion, 561 F.Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
223. In PPL Montana v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012), the Court decided
that the Montana Supreme Court employed an improper test for determining whether
a river was title-navigable, a federal test based on river segments. On the district
court’s errors, see Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Shaffer, The Federal Public Trust
Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL.
L. 399 (2015).
224. Bonser-Lane ex rel TVH v. Texas Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 438
S.W.2d 887, 895 (Tx. App. 2014); see also, e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed
v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that the courts cannot
impose a public trust duty upon the state to regulate greenhouse gas emissions); Funk
v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) aff’d 158 A.3d 642 (mem.) (Pa. 2017)
(holding that the state’s Environmental Rights Amendment did not obligate the state
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
225. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), overruled on standing grounds,
447 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
226. Indeed, the plaintiffs claimed that despite knowledge of the danger
posed by GHG emissions, the federal government “permitted, encouraged, and
otherwise enabled” fossil fuel development and use. Id. at 1233.
227. Id. The court rejected government claims that the case involved a
non-justiciable political question and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. 1242,
1248.
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The court ruled that the plaintiffs constitutional rights were
grounded in due process, as the right to a stable climate was no less a
fundamental liberty right than the right to marry.228 Tracing the origins of
the PTD to Roman law,229 as well as being implicit in due process, the
court described the public trust as “the fundamental understanding that no
government can legitimately abdicate its core sovereign powers.”230
Characterizing the PTD as an inherent aspect of sovereignty, like the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court,231 the decision invoked private trust
principles to interpret public trust duties.232
As for whether the atmosphere was a trust resource, the court
decided that such a declaration was unnecessary, since rising ocean
temperatures and acidification were sufficient to show that GHG
emissions damaged acknowledged trust resources like tidelands and the
ocean.233 The court also rejected the argument that the PTD was
inapplicable to the federal government, finding that that contention to be
“implausible,” since “public trust obligations are inherent aspects of
sovereignty,” and would therefore apply to both sovereign states and the
federal government.234 Inherent in sovereignty, the PTD was not created
by the Constitution but was instead a preexisting governmental duty, just
as due process duties to protect rights to life, liberty, and property.235
Agreeing with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Juliana district court
equated the sovereign trust limitation imposed by the PTD with the
sovereign police power, as both are inherent limits and powers, and neither
is alienable.236 The trial that the court approved was blocked by a divided
Ninth Circuit, which ruled that the youth plaintiffs lacked standing due to

228. Id. at 1250, citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(finding the right to marry to be a liberty right protected by the due process clause).
229. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–54, also citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6
N.J.L. 1, 42 (1821), and Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
230. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252.
231. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
232. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–54, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959); GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, § 582 (updated June 2019).
233. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1256.
234. Id. at 1257. Similarly, the fact that trust obligations were inherent in
sovereignty dissuaded the court from ruling that the federal pollution control statutes
displaced the PTD, distinguishing American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S.
410 (2010) (holding that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law nuisance
claims against major GHG emitters). The decision explained that PTD obligations
cannot be legislated away. Id. at 1260.
235. Id. at 1261.
236. Id.

2021

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

37

a limited judicial institutional capacity to oversee the design and
implementation of a climate remedial plan.237
The Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of the case was not a judgment on
its merits. The court determined that “[t]he plaintiffs have made a
compelling case that action is needed,” and that “it will be increasingly
difficult for the political branches to deny that climate change is occurring;
that the government has had no role in causing it, and that our elected
officials have a moral responsibility to seek solutions.”238 Although the
court averred that “[w]e do not dispute that the broad judicial relief the
plaintiffs seek could well goad the political branches into action,” the
majority decided “[t]hat the other branches may have abdicated their
responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III
courts, no matter how well-intentioned, to step into their shoes,” as the
issues were committed to the political branches of government.239
Consequently, the court “reluctantly conclude[d] . . . the plaintiffs’ case
must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large.”240 The
Ninth Circuit based its standing ruling on an unprecedented, and arguably
impermissible, invocation of the political question doctrine.241 A dissent
agreed that “[n]o case can singlehandedly prevent the catastrophic effects
of climate change,” but maintained that a federal court need not manage at
the details of implementing a climate-change plan to “offer real relief,”
and the fact that the suit could not “alone halt climate change does not
mean that it presents no claim for judicial resolution.”242

2. International Cases
Courts abroad have not felt constrained by restraints like the
political question doctrine. Their proliferating jurisprudence has moved
the scope of the public trust considerably beyond the majority of U.S.
jurisdictions and perhaps even beyond Professor Sax’s half-century old
vision. We examine some of the more notable decisions in this section.

237. 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (importing the political question
doctrine into standing analysis).
238. Id. at 1175.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. A law professors’ amicus brief maintained that the political question
doctrine has no role in standing analysis when there are manageable and discrete
standards to resolve plaintiffs’ claims. Amicus Br.of Law Professors in Supp. of Pls’
Pet. for An En Banc Hr’g in Juliana v. United States, March 11, 2020, No. 18-36082.
242. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175 (Stanton, J., dissenting).
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a. India
In a case with striking resemblance to Illinois Central and its
undertones of corruption, the Indian Supreme Court relied on Sax’s
“erudite article”243 to hold that a state government’s lease of ecologically
fragile land to a resort violated the PTD.244 For five years, the government
had refused a resort’s requests to lease additional land. 245 But in 1993,
when Kamal Nath, whose family had ties to the resort, became Minister of
the Department of Environment and Forests, the government approved the
lease, a reversal which the Court concluded “[s]urely . . . cannot be a
coincidence.”246
The resort began substantial construction on the Beas River,
redirecting its flow to prevent flooding at the resort.247 Drawing
extensively on Sax’s article in examining the Roman and English origins
of the PTD and its American application,248 the court determined that the
PTD was grounded in natural law.249
The Court ruled that the government cannot abdicate its authority
over public trust resources by converting them to private ownership or
commercial use and incorporated Sax’s principle of judicial skepticism
into its analysis.250 Subsequent decisions from the India Supreme Court
have continued to rely on Sax to reinforce and elaborate on India’s PTD,251
finding the PTD to be constitutionally enshrined in due process,252 and
expanding the res of the PTD.

243. M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath & Others, (Dec. 12, 1996) 1 S.C.C. 388,
at *14 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1514672/.
244. Id. at *19.
245. Id. at *7–8.
246. Id. at *7.
247. Id. at *2.
248. The court referenced, in some detail, Illinois Central, Gould v.
Greylock, and Mono Lake, as well as several other cases examined by Sax in his 1970
article. Id. at *16–18.
249. Id. at *13 (“[a]n understanding of the laws of nature must therefore
inform all of our social institutions”).
250. Id. at *18.
251. See, e.g., M.I. Builders Private, Ltd. v. Radhey Shayam Sahu, (1999)
6 S.C.C. 464 (India) (enjoining construction of an underground shopping center
located in a public park); Fomento Resorts & Hotels v. Minguel Martins, 1 N.S.C. 100
(India 2009) (finding a violation of the PTD when a resort constructed facilities that
blocked a public path to a public beach); Reliance Nat. Res. Ltd. v. Reliance Indus.
Ltd., 7 S.C.C. 129 pt. I, ¶ 11 (India 2010) (applying the PTD to natural gas deposits);
see also Blumm & Guthrie, Internationalizing, supra note 15, at 760–65.
252. M.I. Builders, 6 S.C.C. at 466.
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b. The Philippines
The Philippines Constitution requires the government to “protect
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”253 In 1990, Filipino
schoolchildren filed a class action lawsuit challenging timber licenses
granted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.254
After the trial court’s dismissal for lack of a specific legal right to sue, the
Philippines Supreme Court reversed, finding a valid claim under the
constitutional language, enabling the schoolchildren to file a class action
lawsuit on behalf of themselves as well as succeeding generations.255
Rejecting an argument that logging was better suited for the legislative or
executive branches, the Court declared that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology “belongs to a different category of rights altogether for
it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation . . .
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.”256
This public right imposes a “correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.”257
Oposa turned out to be an empty endorsement of the PTD in terms
of logging.258 But egregious pollution of Manila Bay, a popular tourist
destination, prompted the Supreme Court of the Philippines to issue a farreaching order in 2008 that extended to dozens of agencies and called for
environmental public education.259 In Metro Manila Development
Authority v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay, the court reiterated
Oposa’s recognition of a natural right to a “balanced and healthful
ecology” and rejected the agencies’ argument that statutory provisions
253. CONST. art. II, § 16 (Phil.)
254. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 174, 177 (S.C., Jul. 30,
1993) (Phil.).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 188.
257. Id.
258. Although the Oposa decision was a ringing endorsement of the PTD
as an inherent in the Constitution as well as a natural right, the Court failed to enjoin
the logging, which continued on largely unabated. See Dante B. Gatmaytan, The
Illusion of Intergenerational Equity: Oposa v. Factoran as a Pyrrhic Victory, 18 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (2003).
259. Metro. Manila Dev. Auth. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,
G.R. Nos. 171947–48 574 S.C.R.A. 661 (S.C. 2008) (Phil.) (Metro Manila),
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_171947_2008.html; see Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., Manila Bay: A Daunting Challenge in Environmental Rehabilitation and
Protection, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 441 (2009) (Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines and author of the Metro Manila decision, describing the remedy the
Court ordered); see also Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 15, at 770–76.
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protecting Manila Bay were discretionary. Instead, the court found the
duties to be obligatory and issued a writ of mandamus, forcing compliance
with the statutes.260
c. Africa: Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa
Several courts in African nations have located the PTD within
their constitutions, all of which were ratified relatively recently and
include protections for the environment and natural resources.261 For
example, the High Court of Uganda held that the Ugandan federal
government breached the PTD in granting a 50-year permit to a sugar
refinery, allowing the refinery to clear a forest for plantation lands.262
Notably, the project faced strong opposition from the local community,
and the court interpreted the PTD to require local consent, along with
federal consent.263
In Kenya, the High Court at Nairobi expounded on the PTD in a
2006 criminal case in which the government sought sanctions against
polluters discharging raw sewage into the Kiserian River.264 Although the
court found the proceedings to violate due process because the government
only sought sanctions against twenty-three of approximately 100
dischargers, the court took up the PTD on its own motion and ordered the
Ministry of Water to construct a treatment plant.265 The Kenyan court
interpreted the PTD to be part of Kenya constitutional right to life, holding
“[t]he right to a clean environment is primary to all creatures, including
man. It is inherent from the act of creation, the recent restatement in the
Statutes and Constitutions of the world notwithstanding.”266 Kenya

260. Metro Manila, 574 S.C.R.A. at *11–13. In particular, the Court
ordered compliance with § 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, requiring that
“the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure
that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions,” as well
as several provisions of the country’s Clean Water Act and other pollution control
provisions. Id.
261. See Constitution of the Republic of Uganda [CRU] art. 13; id. arts.
26, 42, 46 (2010) (Kenya); S. AFR. CONST., 1996; see also Blumm & Guthrie, supra
note 15, at 777–94.
262. Advocates Coal. for Dev. & Env’t v. Att’y Gen. (ACODE), Misc.
Cause No. 0100 of 2004 (July 11, 2005) (Uganda).
263. Id.
264. Waweru v. Republic, (2006) 1 K.L.R. 677, 677 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
265. Id. at 692.
266. Id. at 687.
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subsequently ratified a new constitution in 2010 which included
provisions expressly incorporating PTD principles.267
The PTD is also deeply rooted in South Africa’s 1996
Constitution, which contains broad public trust language within its bill of
rights.268 The constitution imposes affirmative duties to protect the
environment, and the South African legislature has enacted several
environmental statutes that expressly incorporate the PTD.269 These
statutes codify an expansive public trust that incorporates both traditional
and non-traditional resources.270
d. The Netherlands
In a landmark decision from The Netherlands, the Dutch Supreme
Court affirmed an appellate decision holding that the Dutch government’s
carbon-emissions reduction target for 2020 was inadequate to prevent
dangerous climate change.271 Prior to 2011, the Netherlands had adopted
a target of 30 percent carbon emission reductions, but adjusted it down to
20 percent to match the European Union-wide 20 percent reduction
target.272 The Urgenda Foundation claimed this carbon reduction target
was not an ambitious enough goal to prevent dangerous climate change,
relying on extensive scientific data and treaty obligations to demonstrate
the necessity of keeping atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations below

267. CONST. arts. 26, 42, 46 (2010) (Kenya).
268. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 24 (“Everyone has the right to an
environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and to have the
environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through
reasonable legislative and other measures that—(i) prevent pollution and ecological
degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and
social development.”).
269. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (“NEMA”) §
2(4)(o) (S. Afr.); National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 3(1) (S.Afr.); Mineral and
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (S. Afr.); National Environmental
Management: Biodiversity Act of 2004 § 3(a) (S. Afr.); see Blumm & Guthrie, supra
note 15, at 788–91.
270. Id.; see also David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine,
Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 711, 740–47 (2008).
271. The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, Supreme Court
of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:102 (2019) (“Supreme Court Decision”),
aff’g State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, Hague Court of Appeals,
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (2018) (“Urgenda? Court of Appeals Decision”).
272. Urgenda Court of Appeals Decision, at ¶ 21.
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450 parts per million.273 The court held that articles 2 and 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) required the Dutch
government “to take measures to counter the genuine threat of dangerous
climate change.”274
Although the Supreme Court opinion contained less explicit PTD
language, focusing more on separation of powers issues, the opinion
affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, which had interpreted the right
to life articulated in articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR as imposing a duty of
care requiring “concrete actions to prevent a future violation of these
interests.”275 The court found the Dutch government’s downward
adjustment of its emissions target was a violation of its public trust duties
because the government had previously obligated itself to a greater
reduction by treaty.276 Addressing the state’s argument that the order to
achieve a 25 percent reduction by 2020 amounted to a legislative order
beyond the court’s jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that the order
provided the government with sufficient discretion in enacting specific
legislative measures to withstand separation of powers arguments.277 This
decision was a sharp contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s Juliana decision, in
which the court held that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs was
beyond the institutional capacity a court could impose on the federal
government.278
e. Pakistan
Pakistan courts have found the PTD to be embedded within that
country’s constitutional right to life, which includes protection of
environmental health.279 The Pakistan Supreme Court first recognized the
PTD in a 1992 decision, In re Human Rights Case (Balochistan).280 In
273. Id. at ¶ 3.8, 4–18.
274. Urgenda Supreme Court Decision, at ¶ 5.6.2; Article 2 of the ECHR
protects the right to life and Article 8 protects the right to respect for private and family
life, both of which, according to the Court, relate to environmental issues. Id. at ¶
5.6.2–5.6.3.
275. Urgenda Court of Appeals Decision, at ¶ 41.
276. Id. at ¶ 73.
277. Id. at ¶ 8.2.7.
278. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020), rev’g Juliana
v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016); see also State of Netherlands v.
Urgenda Foundation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2090 (2019) (discussing the court of appeals
decision).
279. PAKISTAN CONST. ART. 9 (“[n]o person shall be deprived of life or
liberty save in accordance with law”); see Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 15, at 766–70.
280. (1992) 1994 PLD (SC) 102 (Pak.).

2021

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

43

Balochistan, a case of original Supreme Court jurisdiction in response to
a newspaper article describing proposed dumping of nuclear and industrial
waste in coastal areas,281 the Supreme Court held that the environmental
harm caused by the dumping would be a violation of Article 9 of the
Constitution, implying that the right to life includes the right to a healthy
environment.282
In 2015, a Pakistan appellate court, in Leghari v. Federation of
Pakistan, relied on the same fundamental principle in deciding not only
that climate inaction by the government was a violation of Article 9.283 The
court proceeded to issue a directive to create government institutions to
address climate change,284 including a Climate Change Commission and
appointed 21 high-level cabinet officials to the commission.285 A group of
Pakistani women recently filed a lawsuit, relying on Leghari, alleging that
Pakistani government’s inaction on climate violated their right to life as
well as that of future generations.286
f. Colombia
In Colombia, a group of children prevailed on their claim that the
government’s failure to reduce deforestation and address climate change
violated their fundamental rights.287 In Future Generations v. Ministry of
Environment and Others, the plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the
development of an area of the Amazon rainforest due to the forest’s role
as a carbon sink critical to prevent drastic climate change.288 The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that the right to life is
“substantially linked and determined by the environment and the
ecosystem.”289
281. Id. at ¶ 1.
282. Id. “No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance
with law.” PAKISTAN CONST. art. 9.
283. (2016) W.P. No. 25501/2015 at *1–2, *4 (Pak.).
284. Id. at *6–7.
285. Id.
286. See Maria Khan et al. v. Federation of Pakistan et al. Writ Petition
No. 8960 of 2019 (Lahore High Court) (Pakistan).
287. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.][Supreme Court], Apr. 15, 2018,
Radicacion n. 11001 22 03 000 2018 00319 00 (Colom.), http://climatecasechart.com/
non-us-case/future-generation-v-ministry-environment-others/.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 13. The available English translation of this opinion does not
explicitly ground the decision in Colombia’s Constitution, but the opinion relies on
the Atrato River case, which recognized natural resources as being protected by the
constitution.
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Like the Urgenda court, the Colombia Supreme Court relied on
treaty obligations and scientific data, as well as the precautionary
principle, to rule in favor of the plaintiffs.290 The court ordered the
government to collaborate with the plaintiffs to formulate a plan to combat
illegal deforestation.291

VI. CONCLUSION—THE FUTURE OF THE PTD
Professor Sax’s celebrated 1970 article foreshadowed much of the
surprising development of the PTD during the past half-century, even
though the article did not emphasize the rapid 19th century expansion of
the scope of the doctrine inland that had moved the doctrine beyond
coastal tidewaters.292 Nor did Sax anticipate the expansion of the doctrine
to waterways traditionally considered to be non-navigable.293 Had Sax
accounted for these developments, his prognosis for the future might have
been more robust, although the doctrine’s great influence in India was
hardly foreseeable.294
290. Id.
291. Id. at 45. Earlier, in 2016, the Colombian Constitutional Court upheld
a citizen challenge to government inaction concerning illegal logging and mining of
the Atrato River Basin. The court interpreted the Constitution as establishing “a
fundamental obligation of the State and society to ensure the care of our natural
resources,” recognized biocultural rights of ethnic communities, and declared there
was a fundamental right to water. The court recognized the Atrato River as a legal
person with rights to protection and restoration, adopted the precautionary principle
concerning ecological preservation, and made numerous references to the need to
safeguard the rights of future generations. To protect these fundamental rights, the
court issued numerous structural injunctions, including calling for legal guardians to
represent the river, an independent commission of experts, watershed restoration
plans, and plans to revive local communities’ ability obtain clean subsistence and
farming. See Center for Social Justice v. Presidency of the Republic, Judgment T622/16 (Const. Ct. Colombia 2016). Rights of nature were also recognized by an India
High Court in 2017, in the so-called Glaciers Decision, remarking that “Rivers,
Forests, Lakes, Water Bodies, Air, Glaciers and Springs have a right to exist, persist,
maintain, sustain and regenerate their own vital ecology system. The rivers are not just
water bodies. They are scientifically and biologically living.” Invoking parens patriae
jurisdiction, the court gave “personhood” status to glaciers, rivers, streams, other
waterbodies, jungles, forests, and grasslands to preserve and conserve them. Miglani
v. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Pet. 140 (High Court of Uttarakhand, 2017).
292. See supra notes 51–74 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text.
294. Sax’s article itself had great influence internationally, forming part of
the bedrock of the India Supreme Court’s M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath decision, 1
S.C.C. 388, at *16–21 (1997) (declaring the public trust doctrine part of “the law of
the land” and striking down a land lease for a resort along the Beas River and ordering
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Predicting the future is a hazardous enterprise, but one prediction
that seems a safe bet is that the PTD in many jurisdictions will continue to
expand to include more trust resources: not only traditionally nonnavigable waters,295 but also terrestrial resources such as wildlife, wildlife
habitat,296 parklands,297 and perhaps forest resources298 seem likely
additions to the trust res. This expansion could develop judicially or
statutorily or, as increasingly occurring abroad, constitutionally. Apart
from constitutional interpretations, the expansion might result from socalled “tributary analysis,” under which a resource is subject to the public
trust if it would adversely affect an acknowledged trust resource. This
approach has already led courts to extend the trust res to beaches, nonnavigable streams, groundwater, and the atmosphere.299 Tributary
analysis, if taken seriously scientifically, should lead to an ecological res,
extending to all significant ecological resources.300
Tributary analysis will not, however, lead courts to apply the PTD
to the federal government. That application will depend on a reassessment
of statements of Supreme Court dicta concerning a 1926 decision of the
Court as construing the lodestar decision of Illinois Central to be grounded
in state law.301 Properly interpreted, the PTD is an inherent limit on all
sovereigns, including the federal government.302 That recognition would,
restoration of the ecology of the area). See also M.I. Builders Private, Ltd. v. Radhey
Shayam Sahu, (1999) 6 S.C.C. 464 (India).
295. See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
296. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in
Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437 (2013).
297. Parklands are public trust resources in a number of states like New
York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY C. WOOD, THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 343–
59 (3d ed. 2021) (collecting the case law). The National Park Service Organic Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012), also contains trust language,“[t]he Secretary . . . shall promote
and regulate the use of the National Park System . . . in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”
298. See supra notes 188–210 (discussing Waiahole Ditch), note 295
(citing cases from Columbia and India) and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 156–73 (beaches), notes 174–88 (non-navigable
streams), notes 189–210 (groundwater), notes 222–43 (the atmosphere).
300. See generally Mary Christina Wood, NATURE’S TRUST:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE (2014).
301. See supra notes 54–65 and accompanying text. A prescient student
paper has deconstructed Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926), as an
inaccurate foundation for the notion that the public trust doctrine recognized in Illinois
Central 146 U.S. 387 (1892), was based on Illinois state law). See Michael Benjamin
Smith, The Misunderstood Legacy of Appleby v. City of New York and Its Effects on
the Federal Public Trust Doctrine (draft 2020).
302. See Blumm & Shaffer, supra note 85.
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among other things, prevent misguided alienations of federal lands or
resources.303
The trust will also likely be interpreted to include both
precautionary and prevention principles.304 The former should reduce the
need for scientific proof as a predicate for taking remedial action. The
latter would require sovereigns to take affirmative steps to prevent adverse
effects on trust resources rather than merely reducing or compensating for
adverse effects. The trust’s application to government funding decisions
will also likely become more commonplace.305
Not to be overlooked are the criteria by which courts judge
governments’ implementation of trust duties. Private trust principles, like
prudence, loyalty, and impartiality, may become more prominent,306
although due to the fact that future generations are beneficiaries of the
trust, some modifications of private trust principles seem in order. The
duties imposed on conservation easement trustees may be a more
appropriate model than private law trustee principles.307 Unlike American
courts, foreign courts have not constrained themselves through standing,
political question, and separation of powers doctrines.308 Instead, they
have readily issued injunctive relief requiring the political branches to
establish institutions to implement the public trust. Examples include The
Philippines Supreme Court in Metro Manila,309 the Pakistan Supreme
Court in Balochistan,310 and the Colombia Constitutional Court in the
Atrato River case.311
A fairly well settled area of public trust law is its utility as a
background principle defending claims of regulatory takings.312 State
303. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
304. See supra notes 189–210 and accompanying text (discussing
Waiahole Ditch). The Atrato River decision, supra note 295, contained detailed
explanations of why both the precautionary principle and the prevention principle
should be part of trust jurisprudence.
305. The landmark case applying the PTD to funding decisions was
Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Foundation, discussed supra notes 211–21 and
accompanying text.
306. The bellwether case was again Pennsylvania Environmental Rights
Foundation, supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text (invoking private law
principles).
307. See Dernbach, supra note 215.
308. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Juliana serves as a prime example,
see supra note 269 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 262–63 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 282–85 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 295.
312. See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel G. Wolfard, Revisiting Background
Principles in Takings Litigation, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1165 (2019), updating and largely
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courts have widely embraced the PTD as a background principle, and
courts have even recognized trust-like declarations in states concerning
ownership of wildlife and water as background principles defenses to
takings claims.313 Unless the U.S. Supreme Court redefines the
background principles defense recognized by Justice Scalia in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,314 the public trust doctrine is likely to
serve as a primary takings defense in the years ahead.315
The PTD may also be expanded through trust language in several
federal statutes. For example, the National Park Service Organic Act
requires the National Park Service to “conserve the scenery and the natural
and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.316 Similarly,
several federal statutes authorize designated trustees to seek natural
resources damages for water, oil, and hazardous waste pollution.317 And
confirming the conclusions reached in Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’
Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005).
313. See Blumm & Wolfard, supra note 312, at 1183–86, 1195–1200.
314. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). Although the Lucas case has been
heralded as establishing the background principles defense, it was actually first
recognized Justice Holmes’ decision in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (“This public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a state,
and grows more pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion
that the private property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper
roots. Whether it be said that such an interest justifies the cutting down by statute,
without compensation, in the exercise of the police power, of what otherwise would
be private rights of property, or that, apart from statute, those rights do not go to the
height of what the defendant seeks to do, the result is the same.”).
315. The Court’s decision in Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162
(2019), may affect the interpretation of background principles by expanding court
review of state regulations alleged to have worked takings. See John D. Echeverria,
Knick v. Township of Scott: A Procedural Boost for Takings Claimants, 51 ABA
TRENDS no. 3 at 7 (2020).
316. National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
317. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5)
(2012) (“The President . . . shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of the natural
resources to recover for the costs of replacing or restoring such resources.”); Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1) (2012) (“The President . . . shall act on
behalf of the public . . . as trustee of natural resources to present a claim for and to
recover damages to the natural resources.”); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Liability, and Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2012) (“The
President . . . shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources to
recover for such damages.”); see also John C. Cruden & Matthew R. Oakes, The Past,
Present, and Future of Natural Resource Damages Claims, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 291
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of course the fundamental National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
contains trust language that has been widely ignored by the courts. Perhaps
a court will recognize that Congress intended to establish a federal trust
when it established “a national policy to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans . . . fulfill[ing]the responsibilities of each
generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations.”318 If
that language were taken seriously by reviewing courts, the results would
parallel some of the international decisions that Professor Sax’s article has
influenced and more than achieve his vision of a half-century ago.

(2016) (discussing natural resource damage claims, which can only be brought by the
trustee responsible for the resource).
318. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) & (b)(1).

